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STATE TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
STOCK

-

ITS CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A

SOURCE OF REVENUE
Arthur F. McNulty*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Having recently weathered one fiscal crisis due to statutory
changes in federal law,1 several states now face the possibility of further revenue loss. For those states which impose a tax on the shares of
national bank and other financial institutions' stock, pending constitutional challenges could result in a substantial erosion of the tax base,
and de facto elimination of the shares tax. Indeed, one court has significantly impaired the use of bank and other financial institution stock as
a state tax source.' Other courts have been forced to go to some length
to validate their state's shares tax.3 The primary issue in the viability of
* Legal Counsel, House Finance Committee, House of Representatives, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, B.A., Temple University (1976); J.D., Drake University (1979).
1. On August 13, 1981, President Reagan signed into law the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 [hereinafter referred to as ERTA]. This legislation
amounted to a monumental tax cut which affected virtually every taxpaying American. In addition to significantly reducing individual federal taxes, ERTA initiated the Accelerated Cost Recovery System. Id. § 201, 95 Stat. at 203. The Accelerated Cost Recovery System, in simple
terms, allows business and commercial taxpayers to write off their capital costs more quickly than
was permitted under prior law. Because so many state corporate taxes are linked to the federal
corporate tax, the federal tax revenue loss was accompanied by a drastic reduction in state tax
revenues. One such estimate put the nationwide revenue loss to states at a figure in excess of $27
billion. See Citizens for Tax Justice, The Impact of Recent Changes in Federal Depreciation Tax
Rules on State Revenues (Aug. 7, 1981) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review office).
In response to the impending federal budgetary crisis brought about by ERTA, Congress
passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. This
law has the effect of reducing state corporate tax losses under the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System. However, state tax losses will continue to remain high, even after this action. See Citizens
for Tax Justice, The Cost to the States of Conforming to the 1981 Federal Depreciation
Rules-As Amended by the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (Sept. 14, 1982) (on
file with University of Dayton Law Review office).
2. Montana Bankers Ass'n v. Montana Dep't of Revenue, 177 Mont. 112, 580 P.2d 909
(1978).
3. Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 285 S.E.2d
920 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 81-1834 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982); Bank of Tex. v. Childs, 615
S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. American Bank and Trust Co. v.

Published by eCommons, 1982

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8:2

shares taxes is whether the value of federal obligations held by
financial institutions can be included in the calculation of the shares
tax. Final resolution of this issue will lie with the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in American Bank and Trust Co. v. Dallas

County.4
This article will examine state shares taxes and the judicial scrutiny which has jeopardized this avenue of taxation. It will also suggest
options, including alternative revenue raising methods, which states
might pursue to preserve the continued viability of this tax. Particular
emphasis will be placed upon those issues which states will have to face
when drafting alternative taxes.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF STATE SHARES TAXES

Prior to congressional intervention, it was clear that national banks
were federal instrumentalities; as such, the bank, and the stock of the
bank, were not amenable to state levies.5 With passage of the National
Bank Act, 6 Congress acknowledged that a shareholder's interest in a
financial institution represented a property interest separate from the
institution and its ownership of assets. Thus, states were empowered to
tax the shares of national bank stock; however, they were prohibited
from taxing the banks directly.' Today, many states have included this
type of tax in their revenue raising structure.8 While these taxes are by

Dallas County, 103 S. Ct. 291 (1982).
4. 103 S. Ct. 291 (1982).
5. Bank Tax Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 200 (1864) (state tax on a valuation equal to the
bank's capital stock held invalid); Bank of Commerce v. Commissioners of New York, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 620 (1862) (state tax on capital of bank stock held unconstitutional); Weston v. City
Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829) (city tax ordinance of federal instruments held unconstitutional); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (state levy on United
States bank held illegal); McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (state taxation
of United States bank obligations held invalid).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1976).
7. Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923) (state shares tax upheld
despite nondeductibility of federal securities); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U.S. 11
(1902) (state may legitimately include the value of United States bonds in its shares tax); National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1869) (bank shares tax held valid despite
the fact that bank's capital included investment in federal securities); Van Allen v. Assessors, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1865) (state bank shares tax upheld despite its indirect imposition on federal
securities). For a more detailed history of the development of bank shares taxes see, J. WOOSLEY,
STATE TAXATION OF BANKS (1935). See also Note, Share Tax, Franchise Tax and Federal
Bonds - The Schuylkill Trust Co. Case, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 758 (1936).
8. The following states utilize a shares tax in one form or another, as a source of revenue:
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 199.022 (West 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-6-90 (1982); IND. CODE § 6-5-6-2
(1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.270 (Baldwin 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1967 (West
Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 367.030 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84:1 (1970); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7701 (Purdon Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-715 (Supp. 1982); TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 11.02 (Vernon 1982); W. VA. CODE § 11-3-14 (1974).
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no means identical, a review of the major elements of the various taxes
should serve to highlight the basis of the present controversy.

Whether an individual's ownership of stock in a particular institution is taxable under a shares tax depends upon the particular state
levying the tax, and the institution's location within the borders of the
state.9 Nearly every state's shares tax applies to nationally chartered

and state chartered banks, but many states extend their tax to other
members of the financial community. 10 Other entities whose stock is
subject to the various shares taxes include trust companies, industrial
loan companies,1 2 savings and loan associations,13 cooperative banks," '
title insurance companies,' 3 investment companies,"6 and cemetery

companies.

7

Institutions whose stock is not taxed under the shares tax

are normally subjected to another tax imposed by the state in which
they are located or doing business.' 8
As previously noted, the shares tax is imposed on the shareholders

of a particular institution, not the institution itself. The tax base of the
various shares taxes, therefore, is geared toward separating out that

9. The shares tax is imposed on the ownership of stock in a particular financial institution.
The nexus of the tax is the financial institution itself; the fact that the shareholder is not a resident of the taxing state is of no consequence. This practice of taxing residents and nonresidents
who own shares in a financial institution located within the taxing jurisdiction has been consistently upheld. See, Society for Say. v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 (1955); First Bank Stock Corp. v.
Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234 (1937); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 443 (1910); Tappan
v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 490 (1874); First Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 353 (1870); Lionberger v. Rouse, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 468 (1870).
10. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 199.022 (West 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-6-90 (1982); IND. CODE
9 6-5-6-2 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.270 (Baldwin 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
47:1967 (West Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 367.030 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84:1,
16-a (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7801 (Purdon Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-715
(Supp. 1982); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 99 11.02, 21.09, 23.1 I, 25.14 (Vernon 1982); W. VA. CODE
111-3-14 (1974).
11. IND. CODE § 6-5-6-2 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.270 (Baldwin 1977).
12. IND. CODE § 6-5-6-2 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-715 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE
§ 11-3-14 (1974).
13. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.270 (Baldwin 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1967
(West Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 11-3-14 (1974).
14. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.270 (Baldwin 1977).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7701 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
16. IND. CODE § 6-5-6-2 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-715 (Supp. 1982).
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-715 (Supp. 1982). A "cemetery company" is defined as "an
individual, partnership, corporation, or association, now or hereafter organized, owning or controlling cemetery lands or property and conducting the business of a cemetery." Id. § 46-1-102(2).
18. For example, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania imposes its shares tax on all shares of
stock held in national and state banks or savings institutions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7701
(Purdon Supp. 1982). A complementary tax is imposed on title insurance and trust companies. Id.
§ 7801. Other members of the financial community are subject to either a gross receipts tax
(imposed on private bankers), or a net earnings tax (imposed on savings banks having no capital
stock, building and loan associations, and savings and loan associations). Id. §§ 1986.2, .3 (Purdon
Supp. 1982), 2221 (1949).
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portion of a financial institution's internal composition which is attributable to the shareholder's interest. This interest is described in the various statutes as "actual value," "true value," "fair cash value," "cash
value," or "actual cash value." 19 It is important to note that none of
these descriptions of the tax base relate to the fair market value of the
shares; rather, they describe the value of a share obtained through the
calculation of some statutory formula. 0 After deducting certain exempt shares, 21 the tax rate is then applied to obtain the tax due.2 2 Although primary liability for the tax lies with the shareholder, states
frequently attempt to require the financial institution to pay the shares
tax. A particular statute may allow for partial or total forgiveness of
19. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-6-91 (1982) (full market value); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
136.270 (Baldwin 1977) (fair cash value); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7701 (Purdon Supp. 1982)
(actual value); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-716 (Supp. 1982) (actual cash value); W. VA. CODE § I I-

3-14 (1974) (true and actual value).
20. Statutory explanations of how to calculate the tax base of the shares tax vary from state
to state. In Pennsylvania, the "actual value" of the shares is determined by taking the sum of "the
amount of capital stock paid-in, the surplus, and undivided profits, and dividing this amount by
the number of shares." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7701 (Purdon Supp. 1982). No regulations have
been promulgated by the Department of Revenue to assist the taxpayer in determining his tax.
This relatively simple formula should be contrasted with the more detailed explanation contained
in other statutes. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 6-5-6-6 (1976).
21. Generally, there are three categories of exempt shares which must be deducted from the
shares tax base before the rate is applied. The first exemption was created by the United States
Supreme Court in Bank of Cal. v. Richardson, 248 U.S. 476 (1919). In that case, the Court held
that shares of one national bank, held by a second national bank, must be deducted from the tax
base of the second or owning bank. Id. at 484-86. The second exemption relates to specific statutory exemptions of certain shares. These exemptions rest on some public policy acknowledged by
the state legislature or constitution. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84:1 (1970) (exempting
shares of preferred stock issued pursuant to the Federal Emergency Banking Act of 1933); FLA.
CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (exempt shares held by educational, religious, or charitable organizations). Finally, exemptions have been created by judicial or administrative interpretation. See
Commonwealth v. First Nat'l Bank of Scranton, 53 Dauph. 245, 48 Pa. D. & C. 399 (1942); 1955
IND. ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 181 (exempting shares held by educational, religious, or charitable
institutions). See also Pa. Corp. Tax Bull. F-81 (Jan. 1976) (exempting loans guaranteed by the
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review office).
22.
State
Rate
Authorization
Florida
Georgia
Indiana
Kentucky

2 mills
5 mills
$.25/$100 of value
$.855/$100 of value

Louisiana

general property tax

Nevada

35% of taxable value

FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2
GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1
IND. CODE § 6-5-6-2 (1976)
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.270
(Baldwin 1977)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1967
(West Supp. 1983)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 367.030(2)
(1981)
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real estate taxes,23 or it may prohibit some other form of local taxation
in attempting to accomplish this end.2 4 If the institution does make the
tax payment on behalf of its shareholders, it may seek restitution for
that payment.25 Regardless of whether the institution pays the shares
tax, it does have certain statutory responsibilities relative to the tax. An
annual report, usually accompanied by the tax remittance, must be
filed with the taxing jurisdiction.2 6 Depending upon the particular state
statute, the institution may have additional reporting requirements be-

yond those which accompany the tax payment.2
This short review of the various statutory provisions demonstrates
that the shares tax is a very unusual tax. In the imposition of the tax,
the financial institution plays an extremely important role. Despite the
fact that the institution is not liable for the tax, it may choose to pay it
on behalf of its shareholders. Payment or nonpayment notwithstanding,
the institution remains intimately involved in the entire shares tax assessment and collection process. This meshing of the roles of the institution, as holder of the corporate assets, and the shareholder, as the
taxpayer, has confused the issue of how to administer the tax.
The issue of whether the shares tax calculation should include a
deduction for federal obligations held by the institution can only be
properly viewed in light of the legislative history surrounding the ex-

Pennsylvania

15 mills

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,

Tennessee

general property tax

TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-716

§ 7701 (Purdon Supp. 1982)
(Supp. 1982)
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.11
(Vernon 1982)
W. VA. CODE § 11-3-14 (1974)
general property tax
West Virginia
23. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-6-90 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-716 (Supp. 1982); W.
VA. CODE § 11-3-14 (1974).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7701, 7801 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
25. First Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 258 U.S. 362 (1922); Home Say. Bank v. Des Moines, 205
U.S. 503 (1907); Lionberger v. Rouse, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 468 (1870); National Bank of Commerce v. Allen, 223 F.2d 472 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 642 (1915). See Society for Say. v.
Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 (1955). "In all the cases upholding state taxes against shareholders, without
the exclusion of federal obligations owned by the corporation, an express or implied right of reimbursement was presupposed." Id. at 152.
26. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-6-90 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1970-71 (West
1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7701, 7801 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
27. Under the Pennsylvania Banks Shares Tax, the institution must file a report with the
Department of Revenue on or before April 15th of each year. This report must delineate the
number of shares of capital stock and the actual value thereof. Additionally, 80% of the tax,
which is considered a prepayment, must accompany the report. The remaining 20% of the tax is
due with a second report, which must be filed by the first of January. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§
7701, 7801 (Purdon Supp. 1982). See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1970-72 (West 1952) (requires
the bank to file a condition of business report and a list of real property and the assessed value
the State Tax 1982
Commission, and a list of shareholders with the local assessor).
thereof with
Published
by eCommons,
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isting statutory scheme.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT DILEMMA

The power of a state to levy any tax upon national banks, their
property, assets, or franchises, hinges upon congressional consent. 8 Financial institutions and their shareholders have alleged that recent congressional action has abolished the federal consent that allowed states
to include the value of federal obligations in their shares tax base." It
is this argument that has produced a split in state decisional law, and
has sent chills up the spines of many state revenue administrators.3 0
Analysis of the current dilemma must begin with the legislation
which allegedly withdrew federal consent to include the value of federal obligations in computing shares taxes. Title 31, section 742 of the
United States Code provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds, Treasury
notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from
taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the
obligation or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise
or other nonproperty taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and

except estate taxes or inheritance taxes."
It was the reading of this section, with only cursory examination of the
legislative history and intent behind its enactment, that led the Montana Supreme Court in Montana Bankers Association v. Montana De-

partment of Revenue," to modify the state's bank shares tax.
28. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968); Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 362 U.S. 628 (1960); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro,
173 U.S. 664 (1899).
29. See Bank of Tex. v. Childs, 615 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), cert. granted sub
nom. American Bank and Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 103 S. Ct. 291 (1982); Bartow County
Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 285 S.E.2d 920 (1982); Montana
Bankers Ass'n v. Montana Dep't of Revenue, 177 Mont. 112, 580 P.2d 909 (1978).
30. The Texas and Georgia Supreme Courts have held that Congress has not abolished its
consent for allowing states to include in their shares tax base interest earned from federal securities, and thus this inclusionary practice does not violate constitutional principles. Childs. 615
S.W.2d at 817; Bartow, 248 Ga. at 711, 285 S.E.2d at 926. In refusing to find a constitutional
violation, these courts refused to follow the lead of the Montana Supreme Court, which held the
inclusion practice unconstitutional. Bankers Ass'n, 177 Mont. at 115, 580 P.2d at 911.
31. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976).
32. 177 Mont. 112, 580 P.2d 909 (1978). The Montana Supreme Court held that the state's
bank shares tax violated the United States Constitution by failing to provide a deduction for the
value of federal obligations held by the bank, in computing the tax base. The court did not strike
down the tax in its entirety, as had been suggested. Id. at 114, 580 P.2d at 910. As is discussed
below, the decision to continue imposition of the tax, with a deduction for the obligations can have
serious revenue consequences for the states. See infra note 64.
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From an historical perspective, the substance of the first sentence
of section 742 has been in effect for over 120 years. The second sentence was added by way of amendment in 1959.11 Prior to this amendment, it was eminently clear that states possessed federal authorization
to include the value of federal obligations in calculating the tax imposed on shares of bank stock." Indeed, the pre-1959 statutory scheme
was considered a legislative expression of constitutional principles.8 5
Examination of the current statute demonstrates that in 1959 Congress
did not alter the first sentence of the statute. Thus, it left intact the
language, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law." 86 This phrase, when
read in conjunction with other relevant portions of the statutory
scheme, demonstrated that bank shares taxes remained viable revenue
sources for states. At the time of the 1959 amendments to section 742,
title 12, section 548 of the United States Code read, in pertinent part:
The legislature of each state may determine and direct, subject to the
provisions of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares
of national banking associations located within its limits. The several
states may (1) tax said shares . . .

The legislative history surrounding the amendments to section 742 did
nothing, at that time, to destroy the language in title 12, section 54 8 ."
33. Second Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 86-346, § 105(a), 73 Stat. 621, 622 (1959).
34. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 341-46 (1968); Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 107 (1923); Bank of Cal. v. Richardson, 248
U.S. 476, 483 (1919); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 669 (1899).
35. Prior to 1959, the United States Supreme Court on several occasions considered the
issue of state taxation of federal obligations through the imposition of a bank shares tax. The
Court's response had been to develop the principle that the tax was levied on the property of the
shareholders, i.e., the stock, and not the property of the bank, i.e., the securities themselves. Its
characterization of this principle has, at times, been dramatic. See Society for Say. v. Bowers, 349
U.S. 143, 148 (1955) (a principle which is "firmly embedded in the law"); Des Moines Nat'l
Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 114 (1923) (a principle deemed "settled law").
36. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). This language was added in 1926 pursuant to a general revision of the Code.
37. Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 267, § 5219, 42 Stat. 1499 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 548
(1976)) (emphasis added).
38. The legislative record shows that the 1959 congressional action was directed at subjects
well beyond those of state taxation of banks and their assets; namely, raising the allowable interest
rates on certain United States bonds and methods of federal debt management. Thus, it is not
surprising that there are but a few legislative statements related to that position of the legislation
on states' ability to impose taxes on federal securities. The legislative history contains the following declaration:
Fourth, the bill makes it clear that both the principle and interest on U.S. obligations are
exempt from all State taxes except nondiscriminatory franchise, etc., taxes.
S. REP. No. 909, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2769.
It is evident from this statement that Congress intended to exempt certain state taxes from
the prohibition of including federal securities in the tax base. Clearly, the prohibition does not
extend to estate and inheritance taxes imposed by the various states. Further, with the authorizaPublished
by eCommons, 1982
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Had there been no further legislative action, it is likely that states

would not find themselves in the position of having to defend their present scheme of taxing shares of stock in banks and other financial institutions. However, in 1969, section 548 underwent a sweeping revision.
In its present form, that section reads:
For the purposes of any tax law enacted under authority of the United
States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized
and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within
which its principle office is located."'

Antagonists of the shares tax argue that the elimination of the reference to state bank shares taxes in section 548, combined with the plain
language of section 742 of title 31 of the present code, shows Congress
intended to abolish state authority to include the value of federal obli-

gations in calculating shares taxes.
Initially, it should be noted there is some question as to whether
section 742 is even relevant to shares taxes. Judicial and legislative history demonstrate that section 742, even after its amendment in 1959,

was never considered a limitation on state authority to impose shares

taxes.4 0 In Van Allen v. Assessors,' one of the first United States Supreme Court decisions regarding shares taxes, the Court never referred
to the predecessor of section 742, despite its apparent conflict with the
section authorizing the taxes. Instead, the Court found there existed a
valid distinction between the national bank and its ownership. This distinction, it was noted, constituted a sufficient basis upon which to allow
the taxation of shareholders. 2 Several years later the Court noted the
shares tax was not a tax on the institution or its holdings, and to hold
otherwise "destroys the separate individuality recognized . . . by this
court."'43
With the addition of the second sentence to section 742, Congress.
delineated certain circumstances under which a state may, directly or
indirectly, include in its tax structure the value of federal obligations
and the interest earned thereon. As previously noted, the decision to
leave the opening phrase of the first sentence of section 742 unaltered
indicates the delineated exceptions are not exclusive."" Additionally, the

tion for imposition of bank shares taxes already contained in the Code, by way of the forerunner
to § 548, it is at least arguable that this statement was broad enough to include such taxes.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976).
40. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
41. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1865).
42. Id. at 583-85.
43. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U.S. 111, 115 (1902).

44. The response of the plaintiff banks is that the opening phrase of § 742 has its inception
in the codification efforts to the 1926 Code and, as such, this phrase has never truly been enacted

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss2/2

19831

STATE TAXATION

exception for franchise or other nonproperty taxes imposed on corporations allows for the imposition of state taxes directly on financial institutions. Prior to 1959, it was generally accepted that direct state taxation of bank-held federal obligations was strictly prohibited."5 This
prohibition, however, did not extend to the taxation of the interests of
the shareholders. This distinction is highlighted by the legislative pronouncements on the 1959 amendment to section 742:
Present law provides that obligations of the United States are to be
exempt from taxation by or under State or local authority. The Supreme
Court has held that this includes the exemption of interest on U.S. obligations from taxation by or under State or local authority. It has been
pointed out to your committee, however, that one State has taken the
position that the statute as now worded does not prohibit a State from
including interest on Federal obligations in computing "gross income"
upon which taxable net income is determined. The bill (sec. 105) makes
it clear that the exemption for Federal obligations extends to every form
of taxation that would require either the obligation, or interest on it, or
both to be considered directly or indirectly in the computation of the tax,
except nondiscriminatory franchise taxes (or other nondiscriminatory
nonproperty taxes imposed in lieu thereof) on corporations and except
estate or inheritance taxes."'
Several significant points may be gleaned from the above passage.
The statement contains no reference to the taxation of bank shareholders, nor does it mention the Van Allen line of cases.47 Indeed, Congress
is in apparent agreement with the judicial treatment accorded financial
institutions and their owners in terms of state taxation. What is mentioned is the proposed practice of one state to directly tax federal obligations through a direct tax on the "gross income" of a financial institution. The legislative response was to nullify this practice by adding
clarifying language, and to offer states a franchise tax as an alternative
method of taxation. Again, it should be noted that at the time of the
1959 amendment to section 742, and for some ten years thereafter, the
statutory scheme contained a specific authorization for state taxation of
shares."8

into law. See Bartow, 248 Ga. at 710 n.6, 285 S.E.2d at 926, n.6. This argument ignores the fact
that the Supreme Court has cited this section as positive law. See Society for Say. v. Bowers, 349
U.S. 143, 144 (1955). It also ignores the fact that Congress did not see fit to repeal this language
in either of the two permanent revisions of the statutory scheme, nor did it see fit to repeal this
language in its temporary revision. See infra text accompanying notes 51-61.
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. S. REP. No. 909, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2773-74.
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supra note1982
35 and accompanying text.
Published48.by eCommons,
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The addition of the franchise and estate or inheritance tax exceptions is also noteworthy. Prior to the 1959 amendment, neither of these
methods of taxation had been included in the statutory scheme as an
acceptable avenue for state revenue raising. Instead, the permission for
taxation had been derived from federal case law, and the legislative

action amounted only to a codification of judicial pronouncements on
the subject. 9 State shares taxes, by contrast, were already contained in
the statutory scheme and there was no need to include them in the
acceptable taxes language amending section 742.50
As indicated above, the statutory authorization for the imposition
of state shares taxes was contained in the legislative forerunner to title
12, section 548 of the Code. The substantial alteration of this section,

performed by Congress in 1969, has raised the question of whether the
authorization for such taxes still exists. Because the revision was so
broad, and because Congress has not altered the opening phrase of the
first sentence of title 31, section 742, examination of this question must
begin with the legislative history which led to enactment of the present
title 12, section 548.

In 1969, Congress undertook the task of clarifying and delineating
the circumstances under which states might tax national banks. This
undertaking was precipitated by a recognition that the then existing
statute had become difficult to manage, and by the numerous changes
which the financial community had undergone in the past century. The
congressional response was the passage of an act, which took the same
basic stance as its predecessor, but which was to have a limited life49. Prior to the 1959 legislative action, there was some question as to whether, and under
what circumstances, a state could impose a franchise tax, which included federal obligations and
the interest earned thereon in the tax base. A long line of cases held that, barring a specific
congressional prohibition, states possessed the authority for this form of taxation. See Werner
Mach. Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U.S. 492 (1956); Tradesmens Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560 (1940); Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931); Flint
v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890);
Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 632 (1868); Society for Say. v. Coite, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1868).
In contrast to what appeared to be a settled doctrine, the Court had, at other times, recognized the franchise tax, and its taxation of federal obligations, as an impermissible method of
taxation. See New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U.S. 665 (1950);
Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929).
In providing an exemption for state estate and inheritance taxes from the prohibition of taxing federal securities, Congress recognized yet another acceptable form of state taxation. These
taxes are similar to franchise taxes in that they are not levied directly on the securities, but are
instead levied on the privilege of succeeding to wealth. See West v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 334
U.S. 717 (1948).
It is suggested that need for clarification, and the recognition that acceptable state taxes are
those which do not directly touch upon federal obligations, spurred the 1959 congressional action.
50. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976).
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time. 51 Also included in the act was a legislative directive to the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to prepare a report detail-

ing the probable impact of state and local taxation of financial institutions under a revision of the statutory language.51 Finally, the act provided a proposed permanent statute which was to take effect, barring

further legislative action, following the termination of the temporary
provision. 3
In recognition of the principle that states should enjoy as much
freedom as possible in the development of their tax structures, Congress expanded state authority to tax banks and financial institutions.
This expanded authority came on several specific fronts, including sales
and use taxes, real property taxes, documentary stamp taxes, tangible

personal property taxes, and various fees for licensing and registration.
Only the prohibition of taxation of intangible personal property of
banks was to continue during the life of the temporary statute." This
expansion of state taxation was an obvious expression of legislative disapproval of recent judicial decisions in this area."
Congress paid careful attention to the issue of state taxation of
bank shares. During the course of the legislative proceedings, concern
was expressed that by repealing the existing statutory section, and its
substantive language, this state tax source might be destroyed. It was
therefore agreed that the statutory exception authorizing such taxes

would remain in the temporary statute as an assurance to states that
their tax base would remain untouched. Additionally, during the twoyear interim period, states had the opportunity to enact amendatory

language, referencing the proposed new section.56 This legislation was
in addition to any other taxes on financial institutions (except an intan-

51.
52.
53.

Act of Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-156, § 1, 83 Stat. 434.
Id. § 4, 83 Stat. at 435.
Id. § 2, 83 Stat. at 434.
54. See S. REP. No. 530, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1597-98 [hereinafter cited as 1969 U.S. CODE].
55. As was previously demonstrated by its 1959 legislative action, Congress has, at times,
taken issue with federal judicial decisions in the area of state taxation of banks and financial
institutions. In Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 393 U.S. 409 (1969), the Supreme Court affirmed a
decision holding that states were without authority to impose documentary stamp taxes on national banks. A similar result was arrived at in First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax
Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968), where it was held that states could not levy their sales and use tax
against such institutions. Clearly, the new statute was intended to reverse those decisions and
allow states to impose these taxes. See 1969 U.S. CODE, supra note 54, at 1598.
56. During the course of its deliberations on the revision of the then-existing law, Congress
recognized that some states specifically referenced the authorization section of the United States
Code, so as to impose a particular tax on national banks. In order to protect the existing tax
structure of those states, while contemporaneously securing the banks' interests in an equitable
scheme of state taxation, the temporary provision was enacted. 1969 U.S. CODE, supra note 54, at
1597. by eCommons, 1982
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gible personal property tax) which states could have legislatively

initiated.

7

The question of state taxation of banks was also considered by the
Board of Governors in its December, 1971 report to Congress." That
report recited the legislative forerunners to the current statute, and
mentioned the judicial development and elaboration of the Van Allen
rule. Also noted was the impact which shares taxes have had on state

and national banks, and the fiscal ramifications on the states should
federal obligations be disallowed in computing the tax base." The report gives no indication that Congress, under the temporary statutes,
wished to withdraw the authorization for state taxation of bank shares.
Indeed, it was noted that great care was taken to assure the viability of

these taxes during that two-year period.60 Further, it was the understanding of the report's authors that this authority would continue,
even after the permanent statute became effective."'
Congress has, of late, recognized the numerous political and
financial changes which have occurred since the issue of state taxation

of national banks first arose. This recognition has spawned the conclusion that states should be entrusted with the maximum flexibility with
which to develop their tax structures as they relate to banks and other

financial institutions.62 This flexibility includes the authority to include
the value of federal obligations and any interest earned thereon in the
bank shares tax base. Neither the 1959 amendment nor the 1969 revision of the statutory scheme expressly abolished this authority, and the
legislative history behind these acts demonstrates no intent to do so.6"

57.
58.

Id. at 1595, 1598-99.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT
ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF BANKS (Comm. Print 1972).

59. Id. at 44, 231-34, 382-95.
60. Id. at 312-18.
61. In commenting on the future viability of state taxation of shares of bank stock, the
report's authors commented as follows: "States that continue to use the shares tax will have no
particular incentive to change these arrangements even if they add other taxes on banks under the
'permanent amendment'." Id. at 44.
62. 1969 U.S. CODE, supra note 54, at 1595.
63. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions in the area of state taxation indicate
that the Court is in full accord with the congressional posture that states should be given as much
flexibility as is constitutionally permissible in developing their tax structure. See United States v.
New Mexico, 102 S. Ct. 1373 (1982) (permitting a state tax on contractors of the United States
government and its instrumentalities); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609
(1981) (upholding as constitutional a state's severance tax on coal); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980) (state corporate tax apportionment formula held constitutional); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (state
method of apportioning corporation's income for corporate tax purposes held valid); Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (upholding a state
franchise tax imposed on an activity which is solely in interstate commerce). Additionally, it
should be noted that at least three members of the Court feel that this autonomy in taxation
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss2/2
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IV.

STATE ALTERNATIVES

As argued above, the better view of the states' ability to include
the value of federal obligations in calculating shares taxes is that congressional authorization for such taxation continues to exist. This view,
however, offers little solace to those states which rely on shares of stock
as a source of revenue. Faced with the prospect of lengthy litigation
which could ultimately result in a significant revenue loss, these states
should consider alternative tax schemes which could effectively counter
64
the consequences of a Montana-type decision on their own shares tax.
A.

Legislative Options
The heart of the present controversy is the congressional amend-

extends to levies on banks and other financial institutions. See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v.
State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968) (three dissenting opinions expressing the view that national banks should no longer be considered federal instrumentalities, and as such, should be subjected to state taxation in the same manner as other entities doing business in a particular state).
64. A judicial determination that states may not include federal obligations and the interest
earned thereon in the tax base of their shares taxes will result in a significant reduction in state
tax collections. The magnitude of this reduction is dependent upon the manner in which the exemption is applied. An example should best serve to highlight the losses states might expect to
experience under the alternative remedy theories available to the courts.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has made the following collections under its bank shares
tax:
Fiscal Year
Receipts (millions)
1981-82
$26.6
1980-81
33.5
1979-80
42.1
1978-79
45.2
1977-78
55.4
1976-77
52.8
1975-76
40.3
If the remedy proposed by the institutions and their shareholders (i.e., that shares tax calculation
should include a deduction from the tax base for federal securities held by the institution) is
granted, all state share tax collections will be eliminated. This is due to the fact that the amount
of institutionally held federal securities far exceeds the tax liability. Additionally, due to its retroactive refund statute, the Commonwealth will be forced to refund all of the above delineated
receipts. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 503(a) (1) & (4) (Purdon Supp. 1982). In all, some $286
million will be lost.
The above remedy is not without its faults. As noted, the shares tax is imposed upon the value
of the shareholders' equity in the institution, and not on the assets held by the institution. To
merely allow the subtraction of the entire value of all exempt assets, without consideration of the
liabilities which gave rise to those assets, ignores the concept of net worth. The proposed remedy
would be appropriate for a tax on the bank's assets or its property, but not for a tax, like the
shares tax, which is levied on the shareholders' equity.
Clearly, a more reasonable approach would be to reduce the net worth of the institution by an
amount which represents the percentage of the total asset base which is exempt. This remedy
preserves the integrity of the concept of net worth while, at the same time, allowing an exemption
for a portion of the asset base to be carried through to net worth. If adopted, this remedy would
significantly reduce state revenue losses. For Pennsylvania, the retroactive loss under its Bank
Shares by
TaxeCommons,
would be reduced
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ments to the statutory scheme which had allowed the inclusion of federal obligations in the shares tax base. Because these amendments are
the root of the problem, states should lobby the United States Congress
for the introduction and passage of clarifying legislation. This legislation should expressly reflect congressional approval of state use of bank
shares taxes. Additionally, the legislation should be retroactive, dating
back to the prior federal action. It would thereby carry out the legislative intent which spurred the 1959 and 1969 amendments."'
However, this alternative is not without problems. It is unlikely
that Congress, faced with curing any number of social and economic
ills, will give high priority to the instant issue. This relatively low priority item is compounded by the fact that the existing statute provides
other forms for state taxation of financial institutions."6 Additionally, it
should be evident that the current dilemma was created by federal
draftsmanship. There is no assurance that further legislation will effectively clarify the congressionally created problems. Finally, further legislation will not obviate the states' penchant for referencing federal
statutes. 7
States might also resort to their own legislative process as a source
for validating their taxation of financial institution stock. States should
consider passage of legislation which would declare their shares taxes
to be franchise taxes. This declaration of legislative intent should be
retroactive to the date the current state statute was enacted, or to the
effective date of the permanent version of the federal authorization
statute. It is readily apparent that federal authorization for state taxation of banks extends to franchise taxes. By definition, franchise taxes
are imposed upon the exercise of some privilege within a particular jurisdiction. 8 There are no apparent limitations on how to measure the

A proposed draft of the clarifying federal legislation might take the following form:
AN ACT
Amending Pub. L. 91-156, 83 Stat. 434
The Congress of the United States hereby enacts as follows:
Section 1. Section 2(a) of 83 Stat. 434, Act of December 24, 1969, is hereby amended to
read:
State Taxation.
For the purposes of any tax law enacted under authority of the United States or any
65.

State, including but not limited to taxes imposed on or measured by the shares of a

financial institution, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized and existing
under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located.
Section 2. This act shall be retroactive to December 24, 1969, it being the intent of Congress
that said taxes imposed on the shares of financial institutions never were and are not now prohibited by any Act of Congress or by the Constitution of the United States.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 73-98.
67. See supra text accompanying note 56.
68. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939), reh'g denied. 308 U.S. 640
(1940); Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933); First Fed. Say. &
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss2/2
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cost of exercising that privilege; hence, measurement of the "actual
value" or some other description of the value of bank stock should
withstand judicial scrutiny."9 In doing so, states may bring their shares
70
taxes within the realm of federal consent to tax.
Just as the proposed amendment to the federal statute, this alternative is not without its faults. The issue of retroactivity must be addressed.7 1 Additionally, there appears to be some judicial precedent
which holds that the utilization of labels as a means for validating a
tax will not, in and of itself, withstand judicial scrutiny. 72 Further, passage of such a statute lends credence to the position of the financial
institutions and shareholders that the present shares tax is illegal. Notwithstanding these concerns, recognition that there is little else which
the legislature can do to preserve its tax makes such action worthy of
pursuit.
B.

Revenue Raising Options
Should it ultimately be determined that Congress has withdrawn

its authorization for inclusion of federal obligations in the state shares
tax base, consideration will have to be given to what revenue raising
methods are available to states. Such a determination will effectively
elevate title 31, section 742 of the Code to the position of dictating the
financial institution tax structure of the various states. Therefore, a detailed examination of this section needs to be conducted. More specifically, the question of what revenue raising methods fall within the umbrella of "nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in

Loan Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 372 Mass. 478, 363 N.E.2d 474 (1977); State v. Clement Nat'l
Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 A. 944, affid, 231 U.S. 120 (1911).
69. It would appear at first glance that current shares taxes do not qualify as franchise
taxes within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). However, because the tax is imposed on the
property of the shareholders, the tax is ad valorem in nature. See Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938) (interpreting Pennsylvania's shares tax as a tax on the property of the
shareholders); Lutz v. Arnold, 208 Ind. 480, 193 N.E. 840 (1935) (Indiana's tax interpreted as
being an excise tax); In re National Bank of Virginia, 137 W. Va. 673, 73 S.E.2d 655 (1952)
(West Virginia's tax is a shares tax).
70. Pennsylvania recently enacted a law which is intended to interpret the state bank shares
and title insurance and trust company taxes in such a way as to bring them within the confines of
the federal authorization. See, 1982 Pa. Laws 317.
71. The issue of a particular statute's retroactive nature is not without several pitfalls. For
thorough and highly-polished discussions of this issue see Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 540 (1956); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216 (1960). It should be pointed
out that Pennsylvania, in its proposed clarifying legislation, has attempted to nullify this problem
by making its statute as retroactive as possible in terms of the effective date of its interpretation.
72. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U.S. 665 (1950);
Educational Films Corp. of Am. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931); Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co.
v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
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lieu thereof imposed on corporations" must be resolved. 3
It is readily evident that Congress, by way of the 1959 amendment, intended to allow states to impose a franchise tax on banks and

other financial institutions. Several states have opted for this form of
taxation,74 including some who apparently read the new statutory
scheme as significantly limiting state taxation of banks.7 5 Franchise
taxes are levied on the privilege of either existing or doing business in
the state. 6 Generally, the yardstick for measuring the liability of a
bank under such taxes is its net income, allocable to the state for the
preceding calendar or fiscal year.77 This similarity to existing corporate
taxation has prompted many states to amend their corporate tax statute to include financial institutions in the existing tax structure. 8
Other states, recognizing the differences between the internal makeup

of banks and other corporate forms of business, have chosen to adopt a
separate statute to tax financial institutions.79 Depending upon the priorities and needs of the various states not currently levying a franchise

tax, either form of draftsmanship appears acceptable.
A straightforward reading of title 31, section 742 of the Code
would lead to the conclusion that states may include the interest on

federal obligations in the tax base of their franchise taxes. Despite this
apparently precise statement of congressional intent, it is not certain
that the practice of including federal obligations will pass constitutional

73. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). Recently, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated a franchise
tax in the form of the state's corporation license tax. First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Department of
Revenue, Mont. -,
654 P.2d 496 (1982). The Montana Corporation License Tax required
the interest income from federal obligations to be included in the net income which was the basis
upon which the license tax was computed. In striking down the tax the court noted "the Department is seeking to tax indirectly what it cannot tax directly, in violation of . . .31 U.S.C. § 742
(1976)." Id. at -,
654 P.2d at 498.
74. See. e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-16-4 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.05.825(17),
10.05.717 (Supp. 1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-901 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1835
(1980); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 23181, 23183 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
12-214 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1101 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
241-2 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 63-3025A (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.60 (West Supp.
1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1107 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, 9 128 (Supp. 1982);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 63, § 2 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. 9 148.030 (Vernon
1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-34 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1451 (McKinney
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-35-02 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2370-71 (West Supp.
1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 317.056 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-14-3 (1980).
75. During the two-year period wherein 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976) awaited effect, several
states chose to abandon their shares tax, opting instead for another type of tax. See BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON STATE AND LOCAL

TAXATION OF BANKS 45 (Comm. Print 1972).
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-901 (1980); OR. REV. STAT.
79. See ALA. CODE § 40-16-4 (Supp. 1982).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss2/2
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muster. It should be noted that some judicial dicta indicates that the
exemption of federal obligations from state taxation is a constitutional
principle; hence, congressional consent to tax is insufficient.8" It should
also be noted that the leading Supreme Court case which struck down
the inclusion practice for franchise taxes has been weakened, but never
overturned, 8 1 despite several opportunities to do so. 82 Finally, the Court
has, time and again, gone to great lengths to uphold taxes not levied on
financial institutions. 8 In contrast, the taxation of federal obligations
held by financial institutions has, on several occasions, been
prohibited.84
Nonetheless, the practice of including the value of federal obligations and the interest earned thereon in the shares tax base seems valid.
Legislative history shows that the addition of the second sentence of
section 742 was intended to clarify the inconsistent judicial interpretations on the validity of this practice.8 5 The plain and simple language of
the sentence is to allow for inclusion. Further, there are equally strong
judicial statements supporting this practice. 6 To hold that the exemp-

80. See Bank Tax Case 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 200, 210 (1865) (finding unconstitutional a New
York tax on the entire capital of a state bank which had its capital invested in federal obligations); Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 620, 634 (1863) (striking down a
tax whose base was a value equal to the sum of the bank's paid-in capital, capital surplus, and
other undistributed capital).
81. In Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929), the Supreme Court struck
down a state franchise tax based upon the corporation's net income which included earnings from
federal securities in the tax base. A similar fate befell a state tax on federal obligations. New
Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U.S. 665, (1950). The confusion
surrounding the analysis utilized by the Court in deciding this question is discussed in Note,
Share Tax, Franchise Tax and Federal Bonds - The Schuylkill Trust Co. Case, 84 U. PA. L.
REV. 758 (1936).
82. The Supreme Court was capable of eliminating the confusion surrounding the states'
utilization of a franchise tax in First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339
(1968). This would be particularly true had the minority opinions been adopted.
83. Werner Mach. Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U.S. 492 (1956) (state general corporate franchise tax upheld despite its failure to include a deduction for federal securities); Pacific
Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480 (1932) (state franchise tax on all corporations upheld); Educational
Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931) (general corporate franchise tax found constitutiorlal);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (general corporate franchise tax held valid).
84. Third Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 174 U.S. 432 (1899) (state franchise tax which includes
federal securities in the tax base held invalid); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664
(1899) (franchise tax invalid for failure to allow deduction of federal securities).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. Alternatively, the history surrounding state
taxation of banks and other financial institutions may be read as a process which culminated with
the 1969 congressional action resulting in 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976). Under this reading, states were
totally prohibited from using any tax on national banks, with subsequent federal legislation allowing for certain forms of taxation, such as the franchise tax and the shares tax. See supra text
accompanying note 7. The 1969 statute, in its permanent form, allows for any type of taxation,
provided it does not act to the benefit of competitors of national banks. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
See supra note1982
7.
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tion of these obligations is a constitutionally based tenet is to ignore the
long line of cases recognizing the power of Congress to submit itself to

state taxation.87 Therefore, it would appear that states, in initiating an
alternative franchise tax on financial institutions, are empowered to include earnings garnered from federal obligations in the tax base.
The most significant limitation on the states' utilization of the

franchise form of bank taxation is that the tax must not be discriminatory in nature.

8

This restriction is directed at preventing state

chartered banks and similar institutions or individuals from receiving
preferential treatment by way of the state tax structure. No definitive
test exists for gauging the presence or absence of illegal discrimination

in a particular scheme of taxation; however, the judiciary has developed certain guidelines. 8 ' A review of these guidelines should be conducted before the actual drafting of an alternative tax.

It is axiomatic that a franchise tax on national banks must not be
discriminatory on its face nor discriminatory in its application. This is
not to say that states cannot impose their tax at a different rate on
national banks than on other institutions and individuals. The prime
consideration in analyzing the tax structure is its impact.' 0 However, it
appears that courts will give closer scrutiny to state taxes which impose
a higher rate on national banks than on similarly situated institutions. 1
This same analysis will apply to differences in the administration and

87. See supra notes 5 & 28 and accompanying text.
88. See 1969 U.S. CODE, supra note 54, at 1597-98. In Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v.
Garner, 103 S. Ct. 692 (1983), the Court invalidated a Tennessee bank tax as not being within
the exception for nondiscriminatory franchise taxes set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). The
Court found that the Tennessee bank tax discriminated "in favor of securities issued by Tennessee
and its political subdivisions and against federal obligations. The [tax] does so by including in the
tax base income from federal obligations while excluding income from otherwise comparable state
and local obligations." 103 S. Ct. at 697. (footnote omitted). The requirement of nondiscrimination between federal and state obligations was also present in the predecessor to § 742. See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467 (1961).
89. In assessing the issue of whether a particular state's tax structure discriminates illegally
against national banks, a two part analysis must be conducted. Initially, the impact that structure
hag on national banks and their competitors must be assessed. Once the impact is measured, the
determination boils down to one of fundamental fairness. For a full discussion of this analysis, see
Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States. 31
HARV.

L.

REV.

321 (1918).

90. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467, reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 874 (1961) (no
illegal discrimination where national banks' stock was taxed at a rate of 2 mills and state banks'
stock was taxed at an aggregate rate of less than I mill); Lionberger v. Rouse, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
468 (1869) (state taxing structure upheld as not discriminatory despite a near two percent levy on
national bank stock and one percent on the stock of state banks).
91. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) (statutory violation found
in state tax structure); Minnesota v. First Nat'l Bank, 273 U.S. 561 (1927) (heavier tax burden
on national banks held unconstitutional); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Richmond, 256 U.S. 635
(1921) (tax rate on national banks nearly double that on state banks held illegal).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss2/2
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enforcement of the tax. 92 In assessing the question of de facto discrimination, consideration must be given to the impact of the state tax structure on other members of the financial community. It is clear that the
statute prohibits imposition of the tax to give a competitive edge to
state chartered banks. However, this prohibition has been liberally construed as not being so broad as to extend to trust companies,93 building
and loan associations, finance companies, mortgage companies, investment companies,94 insurance companies, 95 or other corporations.9 6 Accordingly, states may initiate a franchise tax without including these
business entities as taxpayers.
Barring utilization of a franchise tax, states will be hard pressed to
develop a tax on financial institutions which includes earnings from
federal obligations in the tax base, and as such, adequately reflects the
value of the privileges or property subject to taxation. This does not
mean that a variety of methods for calculating franchise taxes do not
exist. 97 However, the plain language of section 742 of the Code, if restrictively read as advocated by the banks and their shareholders,
strictly limits the states' avenues of taxation. The new tax must be in
the nature of those levied on other corporations doing business in the
state and, therefore, a major upheaval in the corporate tax structure of
the state would have to be initiated. 8
V.

CONCLUSION

Undeniably, the power of states to impose taxes which include the
92. First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927) (illegal discrimination found where
different treatment accorded debts owed by national banks and its competitors); Des Moines Nat'l
Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923) (no illegal discrimination found in different treatment
accorded federal securities held by national banks and state banks); First Nat'l Bank v. Chapman,
173 U.S. 205 (1899) (no statutory violation found in state taxing scheme); People v. Weaver, 100
U.S. 539 (1880) (discrimination in contravention of that anticipated by the statute found in contrasting treatment of the taxpayers' debts).
93. Jenkins v. Neff, 186 U.S. 230 (1902); Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 U.S. 60
(1888).
94. Hoenig v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 59 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 648
(1932).
95. Aberdeen Bank v. Cehalis County, 166 U.S. 440 (1897).
96. Tradesmens Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560 (1940).
97. See, e.g.. Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 611 (1868)
(franchise tax based upon average deposits over half of the year held valid); Society for Say. v.
Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1868) (franchise tax computed on a percentage of deposits in national banks held constitutional).
98. It is apparent that Congress, by way of its 1959 legislative action, intended to allow
state taxation of banks and financial institutions, which is in the nature of the taxation of other
corporate entities located or doing business in the state. In so doing, the federal legislature allowed
for taxation in forms other than the franchise tax. Therefore, it would appear that the State of
Michigan is permitted to levy its Single Business Tax on banks. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
208.1by(West
Supp. 1982).
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value of federal obligations and the interest earned thereon in the tax
base hinges upon congressional authorization. At one time, there was
no question that this authority existed for state taxation in the form of
a shares tax on financial institutions. However, more recent legislative
actions at the federal level have raised the issue of whether these taxes
remain viable sources of revenue for the states.
It is conceivable to read the legislative history which gave rise to
the present statutory scheme for state taxation of banks and financial
institutions in a number of ways. However, it seems evident that Congress had no intention of limiting state taxing authority in the manner
adopted by the Montana Supreme Court. Indeed, in its latest legislative statement on this issue, Congress proposed that states be given considerable latitude in constructing their scheme of taxation as it relates
to the financial community. The only restriction that must be built into
the tax structure is that the final product must be even-handed and not
weighted in favor of national bank competitors.
As a necessary consequence of this relatively free-handed approach to taxation, states must be regarded as continuing to possess
federal consent to levy financial institution shares taxes. This tax is imposed on, and measured by, the shareholders' interests in the financial
institution, and it should be contrasted with taxes imposed on the banks
themselves. Recognizing this separate and distinct interest, the tax can
only adequately represent ownership in the institution and its assets if
the tax base includes the value of federal securities held by it.
Faced with a diminishing revenue base due to a number of political and economic factors, states should pursue those legislative options
which will protect their shares taxes and thereby preserve the consistency of their tax structure. However, should it ultimately be determined that states no longer have access to this method of taxation, alternative revenue raising sources need to be explored. Certainly, a
franchise tax may be initiated, and this tax may be measured in any
number of ways. Consequently, states should assess all possible methods of imposition. Consideration will necessarily have to be given to
both the short-term and long-term effects of the tax. This is particularly true if the state will, in addition to losing its current tax source,
be forced to refund many of the tax dollars it has already collected.
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